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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
John Allan Loewe appeals from the

district court’s denial

of his motion t0 suppress

evidence.

Statement

Of The

Facts

The underlying

And Course Of The Proceedings
facts,

as

found by the

district court

following a hearing on Loewe’s

suppression motion, are as follows:

On April

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic was notiﬁed by SIRCOMM (dispatch) 0f
driver and he was dispatched t0 the Valley Country Store in

12, 2019,

a possible

DUI

The reporting party stated that a man was acting intoxicated,
was stumbling and was dropping items inside the store.
gave a vehicle description: a maroon Buick. This information was

Jerome, Idaho.

possibly from drugs, and

She also
conveyed t0 both Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic and Sgt. Clark Via dispatch while the
ofﬁcers were [en] route t0 the Valley Country Store. When the ofﬁcers arrived,
Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic and Sgt. Clark parked their vehicles in the parking lot Where
they had a clear line of sight t0 observe the maroon Buick.

The vehicle was not

occupied by a driver. Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic did not have his body
cam on While he watched the defendant approach his vehicle.

cam

0r a dash

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic and Sgt. Clark watched Loewe walk out of the Valley
Country Store and approach the maroon Buick. Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic saw Loewe
can'ying what appeared to be “groceries or whatever he was purchasing,” but
Loewe was “kind 0f fumbling them around,” and he was just “acting odd and
spastic.” Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic observed Loewe walk and then pause and then walk
again, pause, and do “weird body movements” that did “not 100k natural.” At the
same time, Loewe had a really hard time controlling whatever he was carrying in
his arms. Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic saw Loewe keep dropping items and picking them
up, while going in and out of his vehicle. Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic described Loewe as
“twitchy” and acting almost like he wasn’t in control 0f his body. When defense
counsel asked “nothing that you saw my client do gave rise t0 your belief that he
was under the inﬂuence of alcohol or other intoxicating substances, was there?”
Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic stated “the behavior matched it, yes.” Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic
believed that the conduct of Loewe was consistent With someone who was under
the inﬂuence of methamphetamine. He observed Loewe in the parking lot for ﬁve
to ten minutes.
Eventually, Loewe got in his vehicle and drove away. Both
ofﬁcers followed Loewe in their vehicles[;] Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic was directly
behind Loewe followed by Sgt. Clark.

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic saw Loewe correctly turn right out of the Valley
Country Store parking lot, heading North 0n Lincoln Avenue. But, Loewe then
immediately stepped on his brake a few times, signaled left, and made a “choppy”
left turn into the median and another “choppy” left turn into the apartment

complex

Three lane changes were required to enter Loewe’s

after signaling again.

apartment complex located approximately one block from the Valley Country
Store.

When

asked

if this

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic stated

When Loewe
“started following

was outside the ordinary course of driving behavior,
it was not.

that

pulled out 0f the Valley Country Store, Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic

him

to

make

a stop.”

Loewe’s “choppy” turns and

repetitive

braking raised Alajbegovic’s suspicions. Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic also stated that this

behavior “was not normal” and was suspicious 0f someone

under the inﬂuence.

As Loewe

who was

possibly

pulled into his apartment complex, Ofﬁcer

Alajbegovic turned 0n his lights and initiated a trafﬁc stop of the vehicle. Ofﬁcer
Alajbegovic believed the totality of the circumstances—dispatch communications

from

SIRCOMM,

watching Loewe’s behavior in the parking

driving behavior—gave

(R.,

him reasonable suspicion t0

lot,

and Loewe’s

initiate the trafﬁc stop.

pp.129-3 1 .)

The

district court additionally

Sgt.

Clark

received

Alajbegovic.

When

his patrol vehicle

Sgt.

found, based on Sergeant Clark’s testimony, that

the

same

Clark arrived

information

from

at the store, the

dispatch

as

Ofﬁcer

reporting party approached

and relayed almost identical information as dispatch: a

man

was stumbling around, had n0 balance, kept dropping items in the store,
and she believed the man was under the inﬂuence 0f something other than
alcohol.
Sgt. Clark testiﬁed this woman was either a manager or an assistant
manager 0f the Valley Country Store.
inside

Sgt.

Clark did not have his body

cam

0r dash

cam on While he watched

Loewe approach his vehicle. However, Sgt. Clark observed the strange conduct
0f Loewe when approaching his vehicle, which he believed to be consistent with
someone under the inﬂuence of methamphetamine. Sgt. Clark identiﬁed Loewe
as the man who exited Valley Country Store and approached the maroon Buick.
Sgt. Clark saw the man drop items and move about in a manner that Clark stated
was consistent With someone Who was under the inﬂuence of methamphetamine.
He described Loewe as having a severe lack 0f balance, and he appeared t0 have
jerky, involuntary muscle movements. Loewe dropped items within the parking
lot, went in and out of his car, back to the trunk, and then dropped more items.
When Loewe drove away, Clark followed the maroon Buick out of the Valley
Country Store directly behind Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic.

Because of the

traffic

on

Lincoln Avenue, Sgt. Clark did not see the maroon Buick driving on Lincoln

Avenue.
initiated

(R.,

Sgt. Clark only

saw the vehicle again

after Officer

Alajbegovic had

the traffi c stop.

pp.132—33.)

After initiating the stop Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic searched

baggy” with “white

crystal like substance” in

methamphetamine.

(R., p.14.)

substance” in Loewe’s

car.

The ofﬁcer

(R., p.14.)

County case n0. CR27-19-1978 (Aug,
County case no. CR27-19-1982
below “for the purposes of all

Loewe ﬁled

Loewe’s

Loewe and found “a

wallet,

which the ofﬁcer suspected was

also found a scale with “traces 0f white

powdery

Loewe with DUI

in

Jerome

and with possession 0f methamphetamine

in

Jerome

Thereafter, the state charged

p.1),

clear plastic

(R., p.128).

The two cases were subsequently consolidated

further hearings and/or trials.” (R., p.101

.)

a motion to suppress evidence, alleging “the ofﬁcers did not have probable

cause to stop” Loewe, “nor did they have reasonable, articulable suspicion” that

Loewe was

driving “under the inﬂuence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances.”

(R., p.97.)

Thus,

Loewe

and Idaho

claimed, the trafﬁc stop violated his 4th

constitutions.1

Amendment

rights

under the United States

(Id.)

Following the hearing on Loewe’s motion, the
decision denying suppression.

(R., pp.128-37.)

AI aj begovi C’ S inconSi dent testimony 0n Whether

In

Loewe

it,

district court

issued a

memorandum

the district court ﬁrst noted

Ofﬁcer

ever committed a trafﬁc Violation:

When asked by defense counsel Whether the left turns into the apartment
complex “constituted any Violation 0f any trafﬁc code or ordinance,” Ofﬁcer
Alajbegovic said they did not. During that line 0f questioning, the State’s attorney
objected 0n the basis 0f repetitiveness and stated that “the ofﬁcer already stated
that [Loewe] did not break any of the Idaho Code laws While he was driving in
this fashion.” The Court sustained the objection, ﬁnding that Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic

1

Loewe does not

Appellant’s brief.)

reassert

any claimed Idaho Constitutional rights Violations on appeal.

(E

had testiﬁed that Loewe did not Violate trafﬁc laws While driving to the apartment
complex.
During questioning by the prosecution, Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic later
testiﬁed that the Defendant did Violate the law while pulling into the apartment
complex by not signaling for a certain amount of time before pulling into the
apartment complex.

(R.,

p.131 (brackets and emphasis in original).)

The

district court rejected

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic’s ultimate “legal conclusions regarding

Whether Loewe actually violated any trafﬁc laws.”
there

is

(Id.)

The court “speciﬁcally [found]

that

insufﬁcient evidence t0 support the trafﬁc stop based solely on” Loewe’s driving; “[i]n

other words,” the court found, “the ofﬁcer did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to

believe a trafﬁc Violation had been committed at the time 0f the stop.” (R., p. 136.)

The court nevertheless concluded
solely on”

Loewe’s driving behavior.

standing alone

known

was not a sufﬁcient

that the stop

(R., p.137.)

was

proper, insofar as

The court found

t0 suppress.

The

“was not based

that “the driving pattern

basis for the stop,” but “the totality of the ‘articulable facts”

t0 the police ofﬁcers created a reasonable suspicion that the driver

under the inﬂuence 0f drugs.”

it

(R., p.135.)

The

district court

was

intoxicated 0r

accordingly denied Loewe’s motion

(R., pp.128-37.)

parties eventually entered into a plea agreement.

pleaded guilty to

DUI and possession

Pursuant t0 that agreement,

0f methamphetamine, and reserved his right to appeal from

the court’s order denying his motion t0 suppress. (R., pp.141-143, 15 1;

In case no.

possession charge;
(R., pp.175-76.)

Loewe

CR27—19-1982, the

Loewe was placed on

district court

sentenced

Aug,

Loewe

p.4)

t0 three years for the

supervised probation and received a withheld judgment.

In case n0. CR27-19-1978, the district court sentenced

time, with credit for time served, and placed

Loewe

t0

180 days

Loewe on unsupervised probation. (Aug,

jail

pp.4-6.)

Loewe ﬁled
CR27-19-1982.

a timely notice of appeal from the order withholding judgment in case no.

(R.,

1978. (Aug, p.5.)

pp.199-201.)

Loewe never ﬁled

a notice of appeal in case n0. CR27-19-

ISSUES
Loewe
1.

states the issues

Whether the

on appeal

as:

Court erred in ﬁnding that the

District

totality

of the circumstances

justiﬁed the trafﬁc stop 0f the Defendant—Appellant.

2.

Whether the
person(s)

District

who

called

Court erred in considering the testimony of unidentiﬁed

Sircomm

0r spoke with the Ofﬁcers at the scene over the

Defendant—Appellant’s objections.

3.

Whether the

District

Court erred in considering the testimony of Ofﬁcer Clark.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Is this

Court without jurisdiction t0 consider Loewe’s challenge t0 the denial of his

CR27-19-1978, because the district court entered separate
judgments of conviction in each case, and Loewe did not ﬁle a notice 0f appeal from the
judgment 0f conviction, or any other order, in CR27-19-1978?
motion

II.

to suppress in case no.

Has Loewe

show that the court committed
case no. CR27- 1 9- 1 982?

failed t0

to suppress in

reversible error in denying his

motion

ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction

T0 Consider Loewe’s Challenge To The Denial Of His Motion To
Suppress In Case No. CR27-19-1978

Perhaps relying on the fact that the

DUI

case and the possession 0f methamphetamine

Loewe appears

case were consolidated below (R., p.101), on appeal
court’s order denying suppression in both the

possession case (case n0. CR27-19-1982)

from the order denying suppression
Court

is

(ﬂ

DUI

case (case n0. CR27-19-1978) and the

Appellant’s brief, p.1).

While Loewe’s appeal

in the possession case is properly before this Court, this

Without jurisdiction t0 consider an appellate challenge in the

jurisdiction t0 hear an appeal

t0 challenge the district

DUI case.

This Court lacks

from case n0. CR27-19-1978 because Loewe never ﬁled a notice 0f

appeal in that case.
Idaho’s appellate rules require appellants t0 ﬁle a notice 0f appeal within 42 days from

the entry

ofjudgment 0r order from Which the appeal

within the 42-day time period

is

is

taken. I.A.R. 14(a). Perfecting an appeal

a jurisdictional requirement. I.A.R. 21 (failure to ﬁle a notice of

appeal within time limits prescribed by appellate rules

is

jurisdictional

and requires automatic

dismissal of the appeal); State V. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 583, 199 P.3d 155, 158 (Ct. App.

2008) (“A timely notice 0f appeal

is

review a case.” (citations omitted».

a prerequisite for an appellate court to have jurisdiction to

A judgment of conviction,

and orders denying a suppression motion are

all

an order withholding judgment,

appealable as a matter of right.

E

I.A.R.

11(C)(1), (0X2), (0X7)-

Here, the district court entered a judgment 0f conviction in case n0. CR27-19-1978.

(Aug, p5.)

Separate and apart from that, the court entered an order Withholding judgment in

case no. CR27-19-1982.

(R., pp.175-78.)

And

it

entered a single order denying Loewe’s

suppression motions in both cases 0n

November

Although Loewe ﬁled a notice of appeal

in case

0f the order Withholding judgment in that case)
that

13, 2019.

(R.,

pp.128-38;

number 1982 0n March

(ﬂ R., pp.199-200),

it

ﬂ

Aug., p3.)

2020 (within 42 days

27,

appears from the record

he never ﬁled a separate notice 0f appeal—either from the judgment of conviction or from

the denial of his suppression

so, this

Court

is

motion—in case 1978

(ﬂ Aug, pp.3-5).

Because he

Without jurisdiction to entertain Loewe’s challenges t0 the

of suppression in the

DUI

case.

I.A.R. 14(a), 21;

Huntsman, 146 Idaho

do

failed to

district court’s denial

at

583-84, 199 P.3d at

158-59.

The

fact that the district court consolidated cases

with jurisdiction to review the

district court’s denial

1978 and 1982 does not vest

this

Court

of Loewe’s motion in case 1978. As noted

above, the judgment 0f conviction and order withholding judgment were separately entered, in
separate cases, and bore different case numbers.

judgment entered
1978).)

in case

1982)

ﬂ

(Compare

R., pp. 175-78 (order Withholding

Aug., pp.6-7 (judgment 0f conviction entered in case

Moreover, Loewe’s notice of appeal makes clear that the only order being appealed

the Order Withholding

Judgment entered against him

body 0f the notice 0f appeal mention, much
entered in case 1978.

in case 1982; neither the caption nor the

less purport t0 appeal from,

it

lacked jurisdiction.

*1 (unpublished, Idaho Ct. App.

May

that

State V. Dickson,

24, 2018).

“from either the judgment 0f conviction

two cases

any order or judgment

(E R., pp.199-200.)

The Idaho Court of Appeals, reviewing a nearly
previously concluded

is

No. 45176, 2018

history,

has

WL 2348635, at

In that case, Dickson failed t0 ﬁle an appeal

or from the denial of his Rule 35 motion” in one of

had been consolidated below.

one case “would effectively render the

identical procedural

Li. at

* 1.

district court’s

Dickson argued

that limiting his appeal to

order consolidating the cases a nullity,”

and

that, accordingly,

“he should be permitted t0 ﬁle a single notice of appeal for both cases

using either case number” on appeal. Li.

The Court of Appeals
jurisdiction

is

at *2.

rejected

Dickson’s

argument,

noting

that

“subject

matter

fundamental and a matter 0f law,” Which “cannot be ignored” and “should be

addressed prior to considering the merits of an appeal.” Li. The Court went 0n t0 explain

why

Dickson’s single notice of appeal did not confer jurisdiction in both cases:

Dickson failed to ﬁle a notice of appeal Within forty-two days from either the
judgment 0f conviction in case 41 16 or from the order denying his Rule 35
motion. Although the district court consolidated case 4432 with case 4116 for
purposes 0f judicial efﬁciency at trial, the court entered separate judgments 0f
conviction, each bearing separate case numbers. Dickson only ﬁled a notice of
appeal from the judgment of conviction in case 4432. That notice of appeal states,
“[Dickson] appeals against the [State] t0 the Idaho Supreme Court from the
Judgment 0f Conviction entered against him in the above-entitled action ....” The
caption of the notice of appeal bears case

number 4432.

Additionally, the notice of

appeal makes no mention 0f case 41 16 in either the caption or the body.

Moreover, the

district court’s

order appointing the Idaho State Appellate Public

Defender supports the conclusion that Dickson only ﬁled a notice of appeal from
the judgment of conviction in case 4432. The caption of the order bears only case

number 4432 and

states,

“[Dickson] has elected t0 pursue a direct appeal in the

above-entitled matter.” Like the notice 0f appeal, the order
either the caption or the

body

makes no reference

in

to case 41 16.

Li. (footnotes omitted).

Thus, the Dickson Court held

it

was “without

jurisdiction, pursuant t0 I.A.R. 21, to

consider the merits of Dickson’s appeal insofar as he challenges the court’s sentencing discretion

or

its

found

decision t0 deny his Rule 35 motion in case 41 16.” Li.

it

“1ack[ed] jurisdiction over case 41 16,”

appeal from case 4432.” Li. While this result

is

it

And because

the Court 0f Appeals

“only review[ed] the merits 0f Dickson’s

found in an unpublished opinion, the same logic

should apply here: this Court lacks jurisdiction t0 hear an appeal from case 1978.

Finally,

does not matter here that Loewe entered a conditional plea agreement that

it

(E

reserved a right t0 appeal in both cases.

jurisdiction

on a

court.”

R., p.148.)

“[P]arties cannot agree to confer

State V. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419,

272 P.3d 382, 391 (2012)

(holding “[t]hus, even if the conditional plea agreement purports t0 reserve these issues for

we

appeal,

are nevertheless without jurisdiction to consider these issues”).

certainly could

While Loewe

have ﬁled notices of appeal in both cases under the plea agreement, he chose not

t0.

Because Loewe

failed t0 ﬁle a notice

of appeal in case n0 CR27-19-1978,

this

Court

is

Without jurisdiction t0 consider the merits of Loewe’s challenge t0 the denial 0f his suppression

motion

DUI

in the

case.

His attempted appeal from that case, t0 the extent

it

exists at

all,

should

be dismissed?

II.

Loewe

Fails

To Show The

District

Court Erred In Denying Suppression In Case

No. CR27-19-1982
A.

Introduction

Loewe
reasons.

First,

argues the district court erroneously denied suppression for essentially three

he contends that the ofﬁcers lacked reasonable suspicion t0 pull him over for

suspected intoxicated driving.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-14.)

court “erred in considering the evidence offered”

brief, p.14.)

2

Lastly,

Loewe claims

by

the

Second,

Loewe argues

manager who called 91 1. (Appellant’s

that the court “erred in considering the testimony

Alternatively, if this Court concludes

CR27-19-1978, such an appeal would

it

fail

the district

0f Ofﬁcer

does have jurisdiction over an appeal from case no.

0n the merits

herein.

10

for all the reasons outlined in Section

II

Clark,” because “the testimony 0f Ofﬁcer Clark

was

irrelevant to

whether or not Ofﬁcer Vekir

Alajbegovic had reasonable, articulable suspicion t0 stop” him. (Appellant’s

Loewe

fails t0

be taken up in

Loewe

Before

turn.

the district court committed reversible error, and his arguments Will

that, the state

for a trafﬁc Violation,

borne out

at the

such, the ofﬁcer

808.

show

and the

submits Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic had probable cause t0 stop

district court erred in

hearing demonstrated that

had probable cause

t0

Loewe changed

make

Violation, the stop

The

concluding otherwise.

was

proper.

As

Code 49-

very least reasonable suspicion) that

at

facts

lanes Without properly signaling.

a trafﬁc stop based 0n a Violation 0f Idaho

Because there was probable cause (or

committed a trafﬁc

brief, p.15.)

The

Loewe

district court’s ultimate denial

of

suppression should be upheld 0n this basis.

But even assuming the court correctly found there was no reasonable suspicion

Loewe committed

a turn signal Violation,

Loewe

fails t0

show

error.

The

that

district court correctly

found that the ofﬁcers reasonably suspected Loewe was driving While intoxicated.

And the

court

did so after properly considering the totality of the circumstances, which included the store

manager’s 911

call,

the observed driving pattern, and the ofﬁcers”

own

observations of Loewe’s

“lack of balance, jerky 0r involuntary movements,” his “repeatedly dropping and picking up

items,

and exhibiting behavior consistent with being under the inﬂuence 0f a drug.”

Based on the
suspect

totality

Loewe was

0f the circumstances,

it

was

plainly reasonable for Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic t0

driving While intoxicated and t0 stop

order denying suppression should be upheld.
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(R., p.135.)

him

for that reason.

The

district court’s

Standard

B.

On

Of Review

review of a ruling 0n a motion t0 suppress, the appellate court defers t0 the

trial

court’s ﬁndings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial court’s

determination as t0 Whether constitutional standards have been satisﬁed in light 0f the facts.
State V. Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State V. Fees, 140 Idaho

81, 84,

90 P.3d 306, 309 (2004).

those “[f]indings Will not be

If

ﬁndings are supported by substantial evidence in the record,

deemed

clearly erroneous.”

State V. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648,

181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State V. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481,

485

(Ct.

App. 2006)).

The

C.

District

Court Erroneouslv Concluded That The Trafﬁc Stop

Reasonable Suspicion That Loewe Committed
It is

Fourth

U.S.

1

requirements and

State V.

(1968).

is

“analyzed under the principles set forth” in Ter_ry

Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134

Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure

2008).

By

Justiﬁed

well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative detention subject t0

Amendment

ﬂ, 392

Was Not

A Signal Violation

must be based 0n probable cause

t0

(Ct.

V.

App.

be reasonable.

Florida V. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d

1203, 1210 (2009).

However, limited investigatory detentions, based 0n

cause, are permissible

When

person has committed, or
Idaho

at 81 1,

203 P.3d

at

is

probable

justiﬁed by an ofﬁcer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a

m,

about t0 commit, a crime.

460 U.S.

at

498;

m,

146

1210.

Thus, “[a]n ofﬁcer

may

also stop a vehicle t0 investigate possible criminal behavior if

being driven contrary t0 trafﬁc laws.”

is

reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle

is

State V.

Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785

(Ct.

there

less than

12

App. 2006)

(citing

United States

V.

M,

449 U.S. 411 (1981)). “Reasonable suspicion requires

less than

probable cause but more

than speculation or instinct on the part of the ofﬁcer.” State V. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246

P.3d 673, 675

based on the

m,
1223

(Ct.

totality

146 Idaho

(Ct.

App. 2010). Whether an ofﬁcer possessed reasonable suspicion

at

0f the circumstances
81

1,

203 P.3d

known

is

t0 the ofﬁcer at or before the time

evaluated

of the stop.

1210; State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220,

at

App. 2003).

A threshold question in this case is whether, apart from any suspected intoxicated driving,
Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic had a reasonable,
Violations.

(R., p.136.)

the stop solely

The

district court

on the basis 0f a trafﬁc

the legal conclusions

articulable suspicion that

Loewe committed any

trafﬁc

found that there was “insufﬁcient evidence” to support

Violation.

(Id.)

made by Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic

The court

arrived there after noting “that

in his testimony

were inconsistent with

respect to Whether the defendant violated any trafﬁc laws While signaling and turning.”

(Id.)

And

While the court “believe[d] Alajbegovic to have been truthful in his testimony about the

facts

and his observations,”

Loewe

it

“disregard[ed] his conclusions of law regarding whether 0r not”

“violated any trafﬁc laws.” (Id.)

The

district court

Violation.” (Id.)

went 0n

The court

to

ﬁnd

“[t]here

was not

clear evidence presented 0f a trafﬁc

additionally pointed out that Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic “did not testify that

he based the trafﬁc stop upon any perceived Violation 0f trafﬁc laws due t0 defendant’s use of
turn signals or driving behavior.” (Id.) “Rather,” the court noted, “his testimony

his reasons for the stop

were based 0n the

totality

of the circumstances.”

(Id.)

was

The

clear that

district court

concluded that Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic did not have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion t0 believe a
trafﬁc Violation

had been committed by the defendant
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at the

time 0f the stop.”

(Id.)

This was an error. The Idaho Code requires that “[a] signal of intention to turn or
right or left

when

required shall be given continuously to

warn other

traffic.”

LC.

§

move

49-808(2).

For drivers 0n “controlled-access highways” or “before turning from a parked position,” that
“shall

be given continuously for not

less than

ﬁve

(5) seconds.”

Li.

“[I]n all other instances,”

the code provides, the signal shall be given “for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet

traveled

by the vehicle before

turning.” Li. (emphasis added).

Under these standards Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic would have had probable

Loewe

reasonable suspicion, that

that

Loewe

violated Section 49-808(2). That

did not start signaling until after the turn

Q.

A11 right.

And When [Loewe] made

the left lane, he

and made
A.

I

that

made

is

cause, 0r at least a

because the ofﬁcer testiﬁed

was made:
that turn

from the right-hand lane

t0

a proper signal, went the proper required distance,

change 0f lane[] without Violating any law; correct?

When

don’t believe he properly signaled.

he started turning, he then

turned his blinker on.

So the speed

limit

0n South Lincoln

A.

Thirty—ﬁve.

Q.

Thirty—ﬁve miles an hour.
believe that he

made

Okay.

What?

is

And when you

a proper signal to

make

the turn

say that you don’t

What do you mean by

that?

A.

Well, he started turning before he

He

started

made

the

signal—he put

changing lanes from the right lane to the

left lane,

his signal 0n.

and as he was

approaching the center of the lane, then his blinker went on.

Would you
A.

He was

say that again.

in the right lane,

he came out t0 the
(TL, p.36, L.4

I

apologize.

and he turned

left lane.

— p.37, L.2 (emphasis

added).)
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his blinker

on about the same time

The
signal

did not

district court

and the

turn;

it

few times, signaled

ambiguously found

,9

‘6

factual

ﬁndings regarding the timing 0f the

“Loewe then immediately stepped on
turn into the median.”

left

Ofﬁcer “Alajbegovic’s

actually violated any trafﬁc laws,

his brake a

Whether Loewe

accept[ed] the factual assertions in his testimony.”

we must

But

(R., pp.130-31.)

legal conclusions regarding

accept the ofﬁcer’s factual assertions, as the court did, then

his lane

accept that

(Id.)

If

Loewe began

change Without signaling—which would have been a Violation under any interpretation

0f Section 49-808.

E

LC.

p. 108,

L.3

—

Thus, the ofﬁcer would have had probable cause, or

§ 49-808(2).

least reasonable suspicion, to stop

TL,

that

and made a ‘choppy’

left,

the court, despite rejecting

we

make any speciﬁc

Loewe

for a suspected Violation of Idaho’s trafﬁc laws.

p.109, L.4 (Where the state argued there

was probable cause based on

at

(E

the trafﬁc

Violation)).3

It is

true that

committed a trafﬁc

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic eventually testiﬁed inconsistently about Whether Loewe

Violation.

(R., p.136.)

When

ﬁrst asked Whether

Loewe “made

0f 1ane[] without Violating any law,” the ofﬁcer correctly testiﬁed that
properly signaled.” (Tr., p.36, Ls.4-1

1.)

Thereafter,

When asked Whether

any Violation 0f any trafﬁc code or ordinance,” the ofﬁcer testiﬁed,

that

change

“I don’t believe

he

the turns “constituted

to the contrary, that they did

not. (Tr., p.45, Ls.5-12.)

3

T0 this point, Loewe argues 0n appeal that the state “implicitly stipulated that nothing [Loewe]
did was in Violation of the trafﬁc laws.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) Not so. The state simply
pointed out that Oﬁcer Alajbegovic, at times, testiﬁed to that effect.
Tr., p.47, L.9 — p.48,

(E

L.8.)

But the

state

never

itself

adopted that View, either implicitly 0r

appropriately,” and to the

—

p.109, L.4.)

laws, the state explicitly

In fact, the state

Loewe “not using his blinker
extent the ofﬁcer thought otherwise, he made a “mistake 0f law.” (TL,
Thus, far from “implicitly stipulating” that Loewe violated n0 trafﬁc

explicitly asserted the opposite: that “there

p.108, L.3

PC

explicitly.

rej ected that

View

was

actual

for”

in the plainest possible terms.
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But the ofﬁcer’s subjective
probable cause analysis.
during the stop 0r months

absence 0f probable cause

legal conclusions, consistent or not, are immaterial to a

The question
later,

is

not whether the ofﬁcer subjectively thought, either

Loewe was committing

“The presence or

a trafﬁc Violation.

determined by a court upon the objective evidence

is

in the case,

upon an oﬂicer’s subjective impression.”

State V. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468,

694 (1999) (emphasis added, quoting State

V.

(Ct.

App. 1988)). Probable cause

Amendment’s concern with

itself is

‘reasonableness’

down

to

subjective intent

the Ninth Circuit,

is

and

irrelevant

is

Whren

the settled rule,

V.

United

It is

V.

which likewise “has consistently held

that a stop or search is not pretextual

Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1414-16 (9th

the rule in Idaho too.

When

States,

517 U.S.

from the United States Supreme
that

Where there

cause to believe that a Violation of law has occurred.” Schwartz, 133 Idaho

693 (quoting United States

and “the Fourth

seizure,”

allows certain actions to be taken in certain

circumstances, whatever the subjective intent” of the ofﬁcer.

Court

988 P.2d 689,

Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 381, 757 P.2d 240, 244

What “justiﬁes a search and

806, 814 (1996) (emphasis in original). This

not

at

an ofﬁcer’s

is

‘probable

467, 988 P.2d at

Cir. 1996)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held

that:

reviewing an ofﬁcer’s actions the court must judge the facts against an

obj ective standard. That

is,

“would the

facts available t0 the

ofﬁcer

at the

moment

0f the seizure or search ‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief”
that the action taken

was

appropriate.”

Because the

facts

making up a probable

cause determination are Viewed from an objective standpoint, the oﬁicer’s
subjective beliefs concerning that determination are not material.

State V. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136,

V.

922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996) (emphasis added, quoting State

Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 925, 523 P.2d 523, 528 (1974) (quoting

also

Omelas

V.

Ter_ry,

392 U.S.

at 22));

ﬂ

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (“The principal components 0f a

determination of reasonable suspicion 0r probable cause will be the events which occurred
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leading up t0 the stop 0r search, and then the decision Whether these historical facts, Viewed from

the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police ofﬁcer,

amount

t0 reasonable suspicion or to

probable cause.”)

Thus, the ofﬁcer’s subjective judgments as to Whether there was probable cause that a
trafﬁc Violation occurred are immaterial.

0n Whether such a Violation occurred.

It

Nor does

it

matter that the ofﬁcer went back and forth

matters even less that, as the district court noted, Ofﬁcer

“Alajbegovic did not testify that he based the trafﬁc stop upon any perceived Violation of trafﬁc

laws due t0 defendant’s use 0f turn signals or driving behavior.”

go

t0 the ofﬁcer’s subjective state

0f mind, Which

is

(R., p.136.) A11

of these things

irrelevant to a probable cause determination.

Because the objective evidence shows there was probable cause that Loewe changed lanes
without properly signaling, and shows the resulting trafﬁc stop would have been objectively
reasonable, the trafﬁc stop

was supported by probable

The

concluding otherwise.

district court erred in

cause, 0r at least reasonable suspicion.

Thus, the court’s order ultimately denying

suppression can and should be afﬁrmed 0n this basis.

D.

Of The Trafﬁc Violation, The District Court Correctly Found That The
Trafﬁc Stop Was Justiﬁed Based On The Totalitv Of The Circumstances, From Which
The Ofﬁcers Reasonably Suspected Loewe Was Driving While Intoxicated
Irrespective

In the alternative, even assuming there

turn

signal

determined

Violation,

that,

suspicion that

Under

Loewe

under the

Loewe was

Tm,

fails

totality

t0

show

was no probable cause
reversible

error.

to stop

The

Loewe based 0n

district

a

court correctly

0f the circumstances, the ofﬁcers had a reasonable, articulable

driving While intoxicated.

an investigative detention must be supported by reasonable, articulable

suspicion that criminal activity

is

underway.

State V. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d
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The “reasonable suspicion” standard

949, 951 (1991).

is

an objective

test that is satisﬁed if

law

enforcement can articulate speciﬁc facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from those
facts, justify the

suspicion that the person detained

State V. Nickerson,

suspicion

P.2d

at

132 Idaho 406, 408, 973 P.2d 758, 760

demanding standard than probable cause.

a less

is

Whether the ofﬁcer had the

951.

determined on the

totality

may warrant

Although a

(Ct.

App. 1999).

Reasonable

Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821

requisite reasonable suspicion t0 detain a citizen is

of the circumstances. State

780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004).

separately, they

or has been involved in criminal activity.

is

series

further investigation

V.

Van Dome, 139 Idaho

of facts

may

961, 964, 88 P.3d

appear innocent

When Viewed together.

State V.

when Viewed

Brumﬁeld, 136

Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001).

“An

effectuate the purpose of the stop.”

(Ct.

App. 2008).

longer than

354 (2015)

is

(internal quotes, brackets

may

m,
district

at the

139 Idaho

drugs, and

and

the purpose of the stop,

moment

the stop

V.

at

it

may

is initiated,

to

1264

last

no

United States, 575 U.S. 348,

“The purpose 0f a stop

citations omitted).

is

not

for during the course 0f the

initially

prompted

984, 88 P.3d at 1224.

court correctly found that, based

driving under the inﬂuence.”

DUI

n0 longer than necessary

evolve suspicion of criminality different from that which

the stop and detention 0f [Loewe]

of a “possible

is

necessary to effectuate that purpose.” Rodriguez

detention there

The

last

State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261,

“Because addressing the infraction

permanently ﬁxed, however,

the stop.”

must be temporary and

investigative detention

on the

was justiﬁed by reasonable,

(R., p.136.)

driver,” driving a

T0 begin
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0f the circumstances,

articulable suspicion that

With, the ofﬁcers

Maroon Buick, Who was

was stumbling and was dropping items

totality

he was

were notiﬁed by dispatch

“acting intoxicated, possibly from

inside the store.”

(R.,

pp.129-30;

Tr., p.1 1,

—

L.8 — p.12, L25; p.72, L.19
the “reporting party”

who

who

Country Store,”

p.73, L.17.)

called 91

“rel

1,

When

“either

ayed almost

the ofﬁcers arrived

a manager or an

identical

infl

assistant

manager of the Valley

information as dispatch: a

stumbling around, had no bdance, kept dropping items

under the

on scene they spoke With

uence of somethi ng other than alcohol

in

man

inside

the store”; “she believed the

(R., p.132; Tr., p.92,

L.18

— p.94,

was

man was
L.15.)

The ofﬁcers then “watched Loewe walk out of the Valley Country Store and approach

maroon Buick”
“acting

in question.

odd and

9)

spastic,

‘6

(R., p.130.)

He was

“kind of fumbling” his groceries around,

walk[ing] and then paus[ing] and then walk[ing] again,” and doing

“weird body movements” that did “not look natural.”
district court further

(Id.

(quoting Tr., p.18, Ls.2-10).)

The

found that “Loewe had a really hard time controlling Whatever he was

carrying in his arms,” insofar as he kept “dropping items and picking

out of his vehicle.”

the

(R., p.130; Tr., p.18, Ls.11-14.)

them up while going

in

and

Per Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic, Loewe was

“‘twitchy’ and acting almost like he wasn’t in control of his body.” (R., p.130 (quoting Tr., p.74,

L.22 — p.75, L.8).)

someone
L.14),

Unsurprisingly, both ofﬁcers testiﬁed that this “matched the behavior of

that could possibly

and “appeared

t0

be under the inﬂuence of methamphetamines”

be consistent With somebody

Who

is

(T12, p.55,

L.3

— p.56,

under the inﬂuence 0f

methamphetamine” (TL, p.95, Ls.2-1 1).
Finally,

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic observed Loewe’s driving

pattern,

Which he believed was

“not normal driving behavior”; in particular, he thought that “repeatedly stepping” 0n the brakes

was “a driving
p.80,

pattern of

someone

that could possibly

Ls.)

19

be under the inﬂuence.” (TL, p.79, L.16 —

Given these

facts, the court sensibly

found “the stop and detention 0f [Loewe] was

justiﬁed by reasonable, articulable suspicion that he

of the circumstances.”

totality

(R., p.136.)

was driving under

the inﬂuence based

Moreover, the court held that the

totality

on the
of the

circumstances “pr0Vide[d] sufﬁcient legal basis for the stop, even Without any consideration of
the defendant’s driving pattern.” (R., p.137.)

On

appeal,

Loewe

district court’s factual

Loewe
can

it

show any

error.

In particular, he does not

was insufﬁcient

be piggybacked onto something

else, i.e.,

for

how

a totality of the circumstances analysis

out suspicious facts one

by

an Ofﬁcer to stop

that

any of the

[his] vehicle,

[Loewe’s] actions in the parking

0f the circumstances’ conclusion.” (Appellant’s

exactly

show

ﬁndings were clearly erroneous, and shows no legal error whatsoever.

asks: if his “driving pattern

‘totality

is

fails t0

is

brief, p.1 1.)

to

lot, t0

how

justify a

But “piggybacking”

facts

be conducted. Ofﬁcers d0 not parcel

one, and ask Whether each fact, standing alone,

would justify a

stop.

Likewise, this Court does not review the record piecemeal and ask Whether any single fact would
Police ofﬁcers and this Court 100k to the aggregate—to the totality of the

justify a stop.

summing

This requires

circumstances.

all

of the suspicious

suspicious driving pattern does indeed “piggyback” 0n the 911

the store employee,

their

own two

eyes.

state disputes),

all

of which

So even

is

added

t0

call,

alone

terms, the

and onto the discussion with

what the ofﬁcers observed

if the driving pattern

the ofﬁcers plainly

T0 use Loewe’s

facts.

in the parking lot with

was “insufﬁcient”

for a stop (Which the

had reasonable suspicion—based 0n the

totality

of the

circumstances—to suspect that Loewe was intoxicated.
Citing

Tim, Loewe

additionally argues that if he

“was not committing a crime of being

under the inﬂuence in public, the ofﬁcer cannot then say that” he

engaged in criminal

activity.

3”

(‘6

'

ls,

has been, 0r about t0 be

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.) Per Loewe, “if he “was not engaged in

20

any criminal

odd, unusual behavior in the parking lot 0f the Valley [Country] Store

activity, his

was insufﬁcient

to justify the stop.” (Appellant’s brief,

pp.13-14 (emphasis added).)

This ﬁmdamentally misapprehends the Ter_ry standard.

Recall that the ofﬁcers

who

stopped Terry never witnessed him commit a crime. They simply saw Terry and his confederates
acting oddly, and unusually, as if they were “casing a job”:

The man paused

moment and looked

in a store Window, then walked 0n a
walked back toward the corner, pausing once
again t0 look in the same store Window. He rejoined his companion at the corner,
and the two conferred brieﬂy. Then the second man went through the same series
0f motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window, walking on
a short distance, turning back, peering in the store Window again, and returning to
confer With the ﬁrst man at the corner. The two men repeated this ritual alternately
between ﬁve and six times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen trips. At one point,
while the two were standing together 0n the corner, a third man approached them
and engaged them brieﬂy in conversation. This man then left the two others and
walked west on Euclid Avenue. Chilton and Ten'y resumed their measured pacing,
peering and conferring. After this had gone 0n for 10 to 12 minutes, the two men
walked off together, heading west on Euclid Avenue, following the path taken
earlier by the third man.

for a

short distance, turned around and

Telly,

392 U.S.

at 6.

Of course,
just as

it is

it is

not illegal t0 pace, peer, and confer With friends outside a store

Window—

not illegal t0 drop groceries, oddly stumble around, and generally appear intoxicated

prior to driving.

But

it is

obviously suspicious t0 be doing

all

of those things.

by deﬁnition, does not mean an ofﬁcer must personally observe
can investigate potential criminal wrongdoing.

This

is

why

the crimes

And

“suspicion,”

commence

the ofﬁcers in

before he

Tegy were

not

required t0 wait until Terry and his crew actually broke into a store in order t0 detain and

investigate them.

Ter_ry,

392 U.S.

at

22-23 (ﬁnding that “a police ofﬁcer

may

in appropriate

circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior even though there

is

n0 probable cause
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to

make an

arrest,”

and

that,

there, “[i]t

would have been poor police work indeed

for an ofﬁcer

same neighborhood

detection of thievery from stores in this

to

of 3O years’ experience in the

have failed

to investigate this

behavior further”).
Likewise, the ofﬁcers here were not required t0 personally observe

and get behind the wheel

0n the

to reasonably suspect they

Loewe

were dealing with an impaired

ingest drugs

driver.

Based

of the circumstances their suspicions that Loewe was intoxicated were entirely

totality

reasonable; as such, the district court correctly found the “the totality of the ‘articulable facts’

known

to the police ofﬁcers created a reasonable suspicion that the driver

under the inﬂuence 0f drugs.”

The

E.

District

Loewe
911

(R., p.135.)

additionally argues that the district court erred

by considering

after the ofﬁcers arrived

in fact, “[t]here

the store manager’s

of the circumstances. As a factual matter, Loewe claims that the

court “incorrectly assumed that the initial caller” t0 911 “was the
”

intoxicated or

Court Properly Considered The 911 Call

call in the totality

Ofﬁcer Clar

was

was no testimony

spoke With Ofﬁcer Clark.”

on scene. (Appellant’s

that the initial caller

(Id.)

reasonably ascertained,” and the

Thus,

call

Loewe

who was

district

same person who spoke with

brief, p.15.)

Loewe

claims that,

unidentiﬁed was the person

who

argues, the 911 caller’s “identity could not be

should not have been considered by the

district court.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)

Loewe
Its

fails t0

show

error here, ﬁrst because the district court did not

“assume” anything.

ﬁndings were based 0n substantial evidence in the record. The court found that the reporting

party “clearly

was not attempting

to conceal her identity

from

police, as she

came out of

the

Valley Country Store and spoke With Sgt. Clark after he arrived,” and that “Clark identiﬁed her
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as either the

manager or an

assistant

manager 0f the

store.” (R., p.135.) This factual

ﬁnding was

supported by substantial evidence in the record: Ofﬁcer Clark’s testimony that “I believe she’s
the

manager 0r

spoke

t0

manager—the reporting party

(TL, p.92, L.20

that the person

—

by ﬁnding

Even granting arguendo
store

error, or

p.94, L.10 (emphasis added).)

he spoke t0 was the reporting party, Loewe

less clearly erred,

and the

the same.

my

vehicle

and

E

manager were two

anything 0f consequence

Let’s assume, as

at all.

1.

show

the district court erred,

Steiart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256.

people—Loewe

different

Because Ofﬁcer Clark testiﬁed

fails t0

the court erred as a matter of

other than the store manager called 91

fact—and assuming the 911

still fails

Loewe

t0

show any

caller

reversible legal

apparently does, that someone

That does not change the fact that the store manager

gave an “almost identical” report as the mystery
that

actually walked over t0

me,” and that “[h]er comments were almost identical t0 What information she gave

SIRCOMM.”

much

assistant

caller.

Which would mean

(TL, p.94, Ls.6-10.)

two people on the scene saw Loewe suspiciously stumbling around, and two people

concluded he was intoxicated.
corroborating the 911

call,

An

additional, independent report

would make

the call

more

reliable,

not

less.

from the

E

store

manager,

State V. Larson, 135

Idaho 99, 102, 15 P.3d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 2000) (Where the Court 0f Appeals found “the
information presented by the caller carried a particular indication of reliability in that

based upon her

was

own

it

was

ﬁrst-hand observations of the reported events as they were occurring” and

“partially corroborated”

by

the ofﬁcer’s

own

observations, such that the Court had

difﬁculty concluding that the totality of these ‘articulable facts’

known

“n0

t0 the police ofﬁcer

created a reasonable suspicion”).

And even

if

disregarded entirely,

we
it

conclude that the 911

does not matter

at

call

was

all—because that
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unreliable and should have been

still

leaves the store manager’s in-

person comments t0 Ofﬁcer Clark: that “there was a male subject inside the store” with

something “obviously wrong with him”; “that he was stumbling around, had no balance, and kept
dropping items in the store”; and that “[s]he believed that he was under the inﬂuence of drugs,
but not alcohol.”

everything of substance in the 911

call,

would have come from considering

Loewe

Because a known, identiﬁed eyewitness reiterated

(TL, p.94, Ls.6-15.)

argues that “[t]here

it

the call itself was purely duplicative evidence.

in the totality

of the circumstances.

was n0 testimony

the initial caller, or the person

with Ofﬁcer Clark, had knowledge in drug impairment detection.”

True enough, but
t0 the store

it

No harm

who spoke

(Appellant’s brief, p.15.)

does not take a drug-recognition expert, or even a store manager (or assistant

manager)

t0 perceive the obvious: if

and [keeps] dropping items,”

that

intoxication. (Tr., p.94, Ls.6-15.)

someone

“something”

Loewe

is

is

“stumbling around, [has] no balance,

“obviously wrong,” which could well be

hints that these things could

have been caused by some

hypothetical “medical condition” (Without ever arguing such a condition actually existed)

Appellant’s brief, p.13), but this shows no error.
innocently explained away, does not

suspicious.

State V.

Simply because circumstances could be

mean we must bend over backwards

Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 41

1,

(ﬂ

t0 ignore

What

is

ﬂatly

283 P.3d 722, 728 (2012) (holding “the

existence of alternative innocent explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable suspicion”).

In any event, Whether the store

manager had drug recognition

The ofﬁcers—Who did have DUI and drug impairment detection
L.21; p.89, L.8

Loewe seemed
Court

is

—

p.90,

training

is

beside the point.

training (TL, p.53, L.11

— p.54,

L.6)—observed the exact same behavior, and themselves concluded

intoxicated (TL, p.55, L.3

—

p.56, L.14; p.95, Ls.2-11).

The question

for this

Whether, based on the totality 0f the circumstances, the ofﬁcers’ conclusion was
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objectively reasonable.

shows

F.

it

was.

The

Loewe

District

Loewe

Julian,

fails to

129 Idaho

at 136,

922 P.2d

at

The evidence comfortably

1062.

show any error.

Court Properly Relied

On Ofﬁcer Clark’s

Testimony

argues in closing that the district court “erred in considering the testimony of

Ofﬁcer Clark.” (Appellant’s
with Ofﬁcer Clark

at the

This

brief, p.15.)

is so,

per Loewe, because “the person

Who spoke

Valley [Country] Store was not identiﬁed by Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic,

nor was the information given to Ofﬁcer Clark relayed t0 Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic.”

Loewe

(Id.)

accordingly claims that “the testimony of Ofﬁcer Clark was irrelevant to Whether or not

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic had reasonable,
have been considered by the court.”
This argument

would support

That

is,

consider only the knowledge of the ofﬁcer

(E

id.)

and “should not

(Id.)

fails for at least three reasons.

his claim of error.

of the circumstances.

articulable suspicion to stop” him,

This

is

First,

Loewe

Loewe provides n0

Who makes

cites

n0

legal authority that

authority that

the trafﬁc stop

When

shows a court can

assessing the totality

unsurprising, because the legal standard in Idaho

is

the

exact opposite. In Idaho, “[w]hether an ofﬁcer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a

citizen is determined

0n the basis of the

totality

of the circumstances—the collective knowledge

0f all those oﬁcers and dispatchers involved.” State
1019, 1025 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added); State V.
780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004).

standard, 0r argue

Why

V.

Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 678, 168 P.3d

Van Dome, 139

Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d

Because Loewe does not even attempt to

the collective

state the correct legal

knowledge doctrine does not foreclose

fails outright.
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his claim here,

it

Second, Loewe’s claim depends on an incorrect portrayal 0f the facts in the record.
claims that “[t]he person

who

spoke with Ofﬁcer Clark

at the

He

Valley [Country] Store was not

identiﬁed by Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic, nor was the information given t0 Oﬂicer Clark relayed
t0

Oﬁcer

Vekz'r

Alajbegovic.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.15

(emphasis added).)

In fact, the

information given to Ofﬁcer Clark was relayed to Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic, as Clark’s testimony

makes

crystal clear:

When

Q.

the reporting party

came up and spoke With you

at the vehicle,

What

did the reporting party inform you?

A.

Her comments were almost

Q.

Okay.

What information she gave
SIRCOMM, just that there was a male subject inside the store and
something was obviously wrong with him. She believed that he was under
the inﬂuence 0f drugs, but not alcohol, and that he was stumbling around,
had n0 balance, and kept dropping items in the store.

And d0 you know

identical

t0

ofﬁcer—was

if

this

information relayed t0

Oﬂicer Beck?[4]

We were parked right next to each other. When she stopped talking to me,

A.

I told him what she had told me.
(TL, p.94, Ls.6-20 (emphasis added).) Thus, even if

it

mattered Whether Clark and Alajbegovic

conferred, the record unmistakably demonstrates that they did.

Third, even if

we

grant that Loewe’s

and assuming there was some error
fails to articulate

any harm

that

ﬂawed View of the law and

in admitting

ﬂowed from

Ofﬁcer Clark’s testimony

it.

This too

manager’s comments were “almost identical” t0 the 911
Alajbegovic was already well aware

even

4

The

if

we

of.

(TL, p.72, L.4

—

is

both correct,

into evidence,

Loewe

unsurprising, because the store

caller’s

p.73,

facts are

report—a report

L22;

p.92, L.20

that

— p.94,

Ofﬁcer

L.10.)

So

pretend that Ofﬁcer Clark did not relay the store manager’s information to Ofﬁcer

parties

below occasionally referred

to

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic as “Ofﬁcer Beck.”
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Alajbegovic,

it

makes no

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic, Who was

difference whatsoever.

the “almost identical” 911 report, already

knew those

facts.

(E

id.)

fully

aware 0f

Any error would have been

harmless.

For

all

of these reasons, Loewe shows no

error,

much

less reversible error,

based 0n the

court considering Ofﬁcer Clark’s testimony.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectﬁllly requests this

and afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

Court dismiss any appeal from case no. CR27-19-1978

of Loewe’s motion t0 suppress in case no. CR27—19-1982.

Alternatively, the state respectfully requests this Court

afﬁrm the denial 0f Loewe’s motion

to

suppress in both cases.

DATED this 8th day of October, 2020.
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